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that his plea would end all criminal prosecutions resulting from
his conduct.

49

New York has long recognized that a state is free, as a matter
of its own law, to impose greater protection to defendants than
those that the Supreme Court holds to be necessary under federal
constitutional standards. New York has done just that in the
constitutional realm of double jeopardy. For example, New York
Criminal Procedure Law, provides greater protection than that
afforded a defendant under both State and Federal Constitutions,
which simply require the prohibition against double jeopardy for
"the same offense." 50 However, in the context of the facts
enunciated in Latham, Criminal Procedure Law section
40.20(2)(d) legislatively articulates that under federal and state
constitutional analysis, the death of an injured person is the
principal element of homicide. This element creates a separate
offense from attempted murder and permits successive
prosecutions without subjecting the defendant to double jeopardy.
Therefore, under the facts enunciated in Latham, New York
statutory law provides no greater protection against double
jeopardy as defined by state and federal constitutional law.
SUPREME COURT

NIAGARA COUNTY

People v. LaDolce 51
(decided September 15, 1994)
Defendant challenged her potential retrial for a depraved
murder charge, during pretrial proceedings, claiming that the

49. Id.
50. Id.

51. 162 Misc. 2d 348, 616 N.Y.S.2d 897 (Sup. CL Niagara County

1994).
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relitigation was barred by both the state52 and federal 53
constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy. 54 The court
held that the retrial of the second count would be hi violation of

both the State and Federal Constitutions since the jury was not
properly instructed to render verdicts on the two inconsistent
counts of intentional murder and depraved heart murder. 55 The
court explained that a guilty verdict of intentional murder
manifests a not guilty verdict of depraved murder. 5 6
Defendant was originally indicted for two counts of murder in
the second degree, 57 and was tried before the Niagara County

Court, where the trial resulted in a hung jury. 58 Subsequently,
she was retried and found guilty of intentional murder, but no

59 On
verdict was rendered on the depraved murder charge.
appeal of that conviction, the appellate division reversed and
remanded for a new trial. 60 During the pretrial proceedings, the

52. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. Article 1, section 6 provides in pertinent
part: "No person shall be subject to be twice put in jeopardy for the same
offense ...... Id.

53. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment states: "No person
shall be ... subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb." Id.
54. LaDolce, 162 Misc. 2d at 350, 616 N.Y.S.2d at 898.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 351, 616 N.Y.S.2d at 899.
57. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25 (1)(2) (McKinney 1987). The statute
provides in pertinent part:
A person is guilty of murder in the second degree when:
1. With intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death
of such person or of a third person; ....
2. Under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life,
he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to
another person, and thereby causes the death of another person ....
Id.
58. LaDolce, 162 Misc.. 2d at 349, 616 N.Y.S.2d at 897.
59. Id.
60. LaDolce, 196 A.D.2d 49, 57, 607 N.Y.S.2d 523, 528 (4th Dep't
1994), remanded, 162 Misc. 2d 348, 616 N.Y.S.2d 897 (Sup. Ct. Niagara
County 1994). In LaDolce, the defendant was charged with killing Chester
Stawiasz, who was found buried in a concrete slab in the basement of a house,
which the defendant had shared with her'boyfriend and his son. Id. at 51, 607
N.Y.S.2d at 524. Defendant claimed she had seen her boyfriend and his son
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defendant moved to dismiss the depraved murder charge,
claiming it was barred by double jeopardy provision. In response,
the New York Supreme Court, Niagara County, issued an oral
decision ruling that the retrial of the depraved murder charge
would place the defendant in double jeopardy, which was
followed with this written decision.61
The New York Supreme Court noted that an analysis of
whether or not defendant could be retried on both charges of
intentional and depraved heart murder must begin with an
examination of New York's Criminal Procedure Law on
inconsistent counts. 62 The court began by stating that the New
York Criminal Procedure Law requires a court to direct the jury
if an indictment concerns two inconsistent counts. 63 Moreover,
the LaDolce court relied on the New York Court of Appeals'

carrying kettles of water to the bathroom, where she heard the victim complain
of the hot water. Id. at 51, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 525. The defendant assumed the
victim was supposedly scalded with hot water, and as a result, suffered a heart
attack, despite efforts to revive him. Id. Next, she insisted that the two of them
left for work, and when they returned, they all decided to bury his body. Id.
Although defendant made the initial report to the police, her boyfriend and his
son entered into a deal with the prosecution. Id. at 52, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 525.
As prosecution witnesses, their testimony revealed that the defendant beat the
victim with an oversized drumstick fbr a period of two days. Because of their
testimony, the defendant was eventually convicted for intentional murder. Id.
61. LaDolce, 162 Misc. 2d at 349, 616 N.Y.S.2d at 898.
62. Id. See N.Y. CRI. PRoC. LAW § 300.30(5) (McKinney 1993).
Section 300.30(5) provides: "'Inconsistent counts.' Two counts are
'inconsistent' when guilt of the offense charged in one necessarily negates guilt
of the offense charged in the other." Id.
63. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 300.40(5) (McKinney 1993). Section
300.40(5) provides inpertinent part:
If an indictment contains two inconsistent counts, the court must submit
at least one thereof. If a verdict of guilty upon either would be
supported by legally sufficient trial evidence, the court may submit both
counts in the alternative and authorize the jury to convict upon one or
the other depending on its findings of fact. In such case, the court must
direct the jury that if it renders a verdict of guilty upon one such count,
it must render a verdict of not guilty upon the other.
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decision in People v. Gallagher,64 which held that intentional
murder and depraved mind murder are in fact inconsistent
counts. 65 However, the LaDolce court noted that the trial court
did not charge the jury in accordance with the New York
statute. 6 6 Instead, the jury was erroneously instructed that once
they arrive at a guilty verdict, under either count, they were not

to consider the other count. 67 Therefore, the LaDolce court
concluded that the jury was improperly instructed, since the
guilty verdict of intentional murder would have led to a not guilty
verdict of depraved heart murder and "retrial of the latter would
be unquestionably barred by constitutional principles of double
68

jeopardy.'
In response, the People relied on People v. Jackson,69 in which
the New York Court of Appeals held that a second count can be

64. 69 N.Y.2d 525, 528, 508 N.E.2d 909, 909, 516 N.Y.S.2d 174, 175,
(1987) (holding that "both counts may be submitted to the jury, but only in the
alternative").
65. Id. at 528, 508 N.E.2d at 909, 516 N.Y.S.2d at 175. In Gallagher,
the defendant had shot and killed a fellow police officer after an all-night
celebration. Id. He was charged in a single indictment with two counts of
murder in the second degree, intentional and depraved mind murder. Id. at
528, 508 N.E.2d at 910, 516 N.Y.S.2d at 175. The trial judge allowed the
additional charge of manslaughter, despite defense counsel's objection that the
judge should charge the jury in the alternative. Id. at 528-29, 508 N.E.2d at
910, 516 N.Y.S.2d at 175. Still, the judge allowed the charge to be made in a
way that the jury could return two guilty verdicts. Id. The appellate division
upheld the lower court's action, but modified the judgment so that the
defendant would not be punished twice for the same crime. Id. However, the
court of appeals held it was error not to charge the two counts in the
alternative, and reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial. Id.
"[lfntentional murder and depraved heart murder-are inconsistent counts." Id.
at 529, 508 N.E.2d at 910, 516 N.Y.S.2d at 175.
66. LaDolce, 162 Misc. 2d at 350, 616 N.Y.S.2d at 898.
67. Id. at 349, 616 N.Y.S.2d at 898.
68. Id. at 350, 616 N.Y.S.2d at 898.
69. 20 N.Y.2d 440, 453, 231 N.E.2d 722, 731, 285 N.Y.S.2d 8, 20
(1967) (holding that the defendant was not placed in double jeopardy because
the trial judge's failure to instruct the jury did not seriously prejudice his
rights), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 928 (1968).
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retried without a violation of double jeopardy. 70 However, the
LaDolce court stated that cited precedents were of no value to the
case at bar. 7 1 The court explained that Jackson predated New
York's Criminal Procedure Law on inconsistent counts, and the
charges in that case were not inherently inconsistent. 72 The court
further explained that People v. Charles7 3 is of no precedential
value. The Charles decision did not involve inconsistent counts,
and when analyzing the case, the LaDolce court noted that the
New York Court of Appeals apportioned greater significance to
the fact that the jury, in Charles, did not consider or reach a
verdict on the remaining counts. 74
However, in LaDolce, the jury did in fact consider both counts
and even requested a read back of the charges for both intentional
and depraved indifference murder. 75 The court found that the
jury verdict "when viewed in the context of the trial court's
charge that the first and second counts were mutually exclusive.
76
." constituted a "not guilty" verdict for depraved murder.
Finally, the court reasoned that under both Jackson and
Charles, it was possible for jurors to return guilty verdicts on all
counts. 77 However, in LaDolce, the charges were inherently
inconsistent, and thus, would be a violation of her constitutional
70. Jackson, 20 N.Y.2d at 451-53, 231 N.E.2d at 730-31, 285 N.Y.S.2d
at 19-20. In Jackson, the defendant had been charged with felony murder and
common law premeditated murder. Id.
71. LaDolce, 162 Misc. 2d at 350-51, 616 N.Y.S.2d at 898-99.
.72. See People v. Myers, 161 A.D.2d 808, 809, 556 N.Y.S.2d 137,138
(2d Dep't 1990) (holding that the counts of "felony niurder and depraved
indifference murder are not inconsistent counts... and the court was not
required to charge them in the alternative"); see also People v. Leonti, 18
N.Y.2d 384, 391-92, 222 N.E.2d 591, 595-96, 275 N.Y.S.2d 825, 831-32
(1966) (stating that a jury could find the defendant guilty of both felony
murder and common law murder), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1007 (1967).
73. 78 N.Y.2d 1044, 1047, 581 N.E.2d 1336, 1338, 576"N.Y.S.2d 81,
83 (1991). In Charles, the court held that defendant's constitutional right
against double jeopardy would not be violated where a jury did not return a
verdict on the counts to be retried. Id.
74. LaDolce, 162 Misc. 2d at 350, 616 N.Y.S.2d at 899.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 350-51, 616 N.Y.S.2d at 899.
77. Id. at 351, 616 N.Y.S.2d at 899.
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right under the Double Jeopardy Clause. Thus, the court held that
to retry the defendant on the second count was violative of her
right not to be placed in double jeopardy. 78
The United States Constitution has a Double Jeopardy Clause
which safeguards a defendant's rights as well. This right has
"from the very beginning been part of our constitutional
tradition" 79 and is "clearly 'fundamental to the American scheme
of justice.'"80 Hence, the Fifth Amendment protects a criminal
defendant from multiple punishments and repeated prosecutions
for the same offense. Accordingly, the LaDolce court dismissed
the second count as violative of both the New York and Federal
Constitutions. 81

JUSTICE COURT
SECOND JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

People v. Hempstead Video, Inc. 82
(printed December 29, 1994)
Hempstead Video, Inc., retailer of "adult novelties," moved to
dismiss summonses and information filed against it pursuant to a
Village of Valley Stream permit requirement on the grounds that
the ordinance's enactment and enforcement constituted double
jeopardy, 83 selective prosecution, 84 and impermissible regulation
78. Id.

79. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 796 (1968).
80. Id. (citation omitted).
81. LaDolce, 162 Misc. 2d at 351, 616 N.Y.S.2d at 899.
82. N.Y. L.J., Dec. 29, 1994, at 27 (Justice Ct. 2d Jud. Dep't 1994).
83. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment provides in pertinent
part: "[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb." Id.; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. Section six of the New
York Constitution provides in pertinent part: "No person shall be subject to be
twice put in jeopardy for the same offense .... " Id.
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